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Schwartz and Kaufman: Puntive Damages

PUNITIVE DAMAGES -- DEVELOPMENTS IN
SECTION 1983 CASES
Martin A. Schwartz & Eileen Kaufman*
INTRODUCTION

This article examines recent developments concerning punitive
damages in section 1983 civil rights cases. 1 We will focus upon
three major issues: first, the due process requirements for
punitive damages claims in federal court section 1983 actions;
second, issues relating to evidence of the defendant's net worth;
and third, the propriety of summation references to the Rodney
King case. Before tackling these specific issues, some
background is in order.
In Smith v. Wade,2 the Supreme Court held that punitive
damages may be awarded in a section 1983 action against an
* Martin A. Schwartz and Eileen Kaufman are professors at the Touro
College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. Professor Schwartz is co-author,
with John Kirklin, of SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENsES AND
FEEs (2d ed. 1991). Professor Kaufman is a reporter for New York Pattern
Jury Instructions. The authors express their appreciation for the valuable
assistance of William Graham and David Wallman of the Touro Law Review.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986). Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
2. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
3. Id. at 56. Under Wade, in order to demonstrate that the defendant
acted with "'reckless or callous indifference,'" there must be a showing that
either (1) "'defendant actually derive[d] satisfaction from hurting the
plaintiff'" or (2) that defendant, while not particularly desiring to harm
plaintiff, "'trample[d] on the plaintiff's rights in a fashion that can clearly be
called reckless, to accomplish his own aims.'" 1 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ &
JOHN E. KnumL, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMs, DEFENSES AND FEES
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official in his or her personal capacity "when the defendant's
conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or
when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally
protected rights of others." 3 The Supreme Court's decision in
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.4 immunizes municipal
entities from awards of punitive damages under section 1983. 5
§ 16.7, at 885 (2d ed. 1991) (quoting Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752 F.2d
285, 289 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 117 (1985)). A defendant is said to
"trample" on the rights of a plaintiff when it is demonstrated that defendant
"engaged in plainly unlawful conduct." SCHWARTZ & KRKLIN, § 16.7, at 885
(quoting Soderbeck, 752 F.2d at 292). Regarding application of the "reckless
and callous indifference" standard, see for example Tosker v. Moore, 738 F.
Supp. 1005, 1015-16 (S.D. W.Va. 1990) (employing a reckless and callous
indifference standard to assess punitive damages on governor who refused to
obey a court order to release prisoners due to unconstitutional overcrowding of
prison); Cornelius v. La Croix, 631 F. Supp. 610, 621 (E.D. Wis. 1986)
(removing corporation's minority business enterprise status without affording it
an opportunity to be heard did not rise to the level of reckless and callous
indifference warranting punitive damages), aff'd, 838 F.2d 207 (1988)..
4. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
5. Id. at 271. Plaintiffs brought suit against the City of Newport and its
officials claiming that their Constitutional rights to due process and free
expression were violated when the city canceled plaintiffs' entertainment
license and interfered with their contractual relationship. Id. at 252. Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs sought punitive and compensatory damages
against the defendants. Id. The Supreme Court held that, in accordance with
public policy, common law immunity and the intent of Congress, the defendant
municipality was immune from punitive damages. Id. at 271.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/10

2

19941

Schwartz and Kaufman: Puntive Damages

P UNiTIVE DAMAGES

543

And, completing the picture, punitive damages may not be
awarded against a state or state agency in a federal court section
6
1983 action, principally because of the Eleventh Amendment. It
6. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or the Subjects of any Foreign State."
Id.
The Eleventh Amendment acts as a bar to suits in federal court seeking
retrospective relief against a state or state entity. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 678 (1974). It forecloses suits by private parties seeking to recover
damages from funds in a state treasury if the state does not consent to the suit.
Id. at 662-63. However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against
state officials in their individual capacity. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct.
358, 360 (1991) (holding that state official sued in individual capacity is a
section 1983 "person"); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974) ("[Ihe
Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official confronted by a
claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state
law.... ."). Under the fiction of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a
state official sued in an official capacity may be subjected to suits seeking
prospective relief for violations of federal law. Id. at 154-60. This is because
the state official can never be given the authority to violate the Federal
Constitution. Id. at 159-60. If a state official violates the Federal Constitution,
he or she is not acting for the state and is thus stripped of his official authority.
Id. Accordingly, the state official may be sued in an official capacity. Id. This
doctrine is often described as a "fiction" since an injunction against the state
official in substance operates against the state government. Furthermore, an
injunction may require payment from the state treasury. Young thus allows an
individual to force a state government to comply with the Federal Constitution.
With respect to state officials, the Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), held that an action brought against a state
official acting in his official capacity is an action against the official's office
and is no different than an action brought against the State, neither of which
are section 1983 "persons." Id. at 71. Will's "bifurcated" definition of
"person" reflects the same retrospective/prospective dichotomy found under
the Eleventh Amendment. See id. Footnote 10 in WIl/, an exception to the
Court's holding, points out that suits for prospective relief, against a state
official in an official capacity, are not treated as suits against the state. Id. at
71 n.10. Therefore, the application of section 1983 is "bifurcated" depending
upon whether the plaintiff seeks prospective or injunctive relief. Id. n. 10. The
Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state court. See Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980). The Supreme Court stated in Thiboutot that "no
Eleventh Amendment question is present... when an action is brought in a
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is the defendant official, then, who may be asked to answer
7
personally in punitive damages.
state court since the Amendment, by its terms, restrains only '[t]he Judicial
power of the United States.'" Id.
A municipality is a section 1983 "person." In Monnel v. Dep't of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that "the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress
did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included
among those persons to whom § 1983 applies." Id. at 690. However, "a
municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory." Id. at 691. The municipality can only be held liable if the
constitutional violation occurred due to enforcement of a "policy or custom."
Id. at 700-01. Lastly, a political subdivision which is not provided immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment is not considered to be an arm of the state, and
is thus a section 1983 "person." See Rawlings v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs.,
820 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Iowa 1993). Rawlings provides a detailed history of
the controversy surrounding the question of whether a state is a person for
purposes of section 1983. Id. at 425-26 n.2-3. Subsequent to Will, several
courts have held that state agencies are not persons under section 1983. See,
e.g., Cronen v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 977 F.2d 934, 936-37 (5th Cir.
1990) (dismissing suit for damages and injunctive relief against Texas
Department of Human Services brought by beneficiary of food stamp
program).
7. A state or municipality may choose to indemnify officials for section
1983 punitive damages liability. See 1 & 2 ScHWARTZ & KwIRKN, supra note
3 § 16.20, at 908-09 (2d ed. Supp. 1993). To determine whether an employee
or state officer will avoid section 1983 liability under a state indemnification
statute, it is necessary to examine and interpret the specific statute. Id. In order
for a state officer or employee to be indemnified from section 1983 liability, it
typically must be determined that conduct complained of was within the scope
of his or her employment; see also Burke v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493-94 (8th
Cir. 1991) (finding that Arkansas law which provided for indemnification by
state for actual damages assessed against state employees or officials did not
constitute waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Graham v. Sauk Praire
Police Comm'n, 915 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1990) The Graham court found that
even though a public employee acted under color of law for purposes of
section 1983, it did not automatically follow that the employee acted within
scope of employment under state indemnity statute because color of law
category was broader than scope of employment category. Id. at 1093-96;
Cornwall v. City of Riverside, 896 F.2d 398, 399-400 (9th Cir.) (holding that
it is not against federal law for a city to indemnify officers acting in good
faith, in the course of their employment to pay for section 1983 damages levied
against them), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1026 (1990); Blaylock v. Schwinder,
862 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1988). The court in Blaylock determined that
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A wide range of issues may arise on a section 1983 punitive
damages claim. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Larez v. City of
Los Angeles8 provides a useful example. In that excessive force
case, the jury awarded the plaintiffs punitive damages against the
individual police officers and against Police Commissioner Gates
in his personal capacity. 9 The circuit court made the following
rulings concerning punitive damages:

1.

Instructions: "The district court properly instructed the

jury that punitive damages must be fixed with calm discretion and
sound reason, and must never be... awarded... because of

sympathy, or bias, or prejudice ....

";10

2.
Excessiveness and Appellate Review: The punitive
damages awarded against the police officers were not grossly or
monstrously excessive. "That damages were specifically tailored
to the degree of harm each plaintiff withstood indicates to us that
the jury was operating lawfully and was not inflamed." 11 As to

Commissioner Gates, the circuit court stated that once the Smith
v. Wade reckless or callous disregard standard is satisfied, the
circuit court "cannot review the jury's decision to award punitive
damages, which represents its discretionary moral judgment

Montana's indemnification statute "[did] not automatically extend immunity to
state officials ... ." Id.; Demery v. Kuperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1146-49 (9th
Cir. 1984) (holding that California law which mandated that the state pay
damages for section 1983 violations brought against state officers if their acts
were within the course of employment did not violate Eleventh Amendment),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985).
8. 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991).
9. Id. at 636. The jury awarded $170,000 in punitive damages against
Police Commissioner Gates in his personal capacity. Id.
10. Id. at 639. The defendants appealed the district court's jury
instructions on punitive damages and claimed the damages were "grossly
excessive." Id. However, the Ninth Circuit stated that the defendants'
objections to the jury instructions could not be considered, because they did not
make an objection to the jury instructions in the district court. Id.
11. Id. at 636. The court instructed the jury that punitive damages should
be awarded only if the officers' acts were "oppressively, wantonly or
maliciously committed." Id.
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culpability ...other
than
for
gross
about
Gates'
12
excessiveness;"
3.
Purposes of Punitive Damages: Although deterrence is a
"primary" purpose of section 1983 punitive damages, punishment
13
is an equally permissible goal;
Standardof Conduct: Smith v. Wade held that the same
4.
reckless or callous indifference that gives rise to a constitutional
violation may support an award of punitive damages. 14 The
circuit court in Larez ruled that it is not unconstitutional for
punitive damages to be awarded in the absence of a finding of
actual malice. 15 The court in Larez also found sufficient evidence
of the Commissioner's recklessness or callous indifference to
support the punitive damages award. 16
With this background, we will now focus on specific punitive
developments in section 1983 cases.

DUE PROCESS
Increasingly, in section 1983 cases, as well as in other
contexts, defendants have challenged punitive damages awards on

constitutional grounds. 17 In its last two Terms, the Supreme
12. Id. at 649. As discussed, infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text, the
Ninth Circuit subsequently reformulated its standard of appellate review. See
Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993). The court in Morgan
also developed a three-stage analysis to be applied when reviewing punitive
damages. Id. at 1256.
13. Larez, 946 F.2d at 648.
14. 461 U.S. at 56.
15. Larez, 946 F.2d at 639.
16. Id. at 649. However, the circuit court reversed and remanded on other
grounds, thus finding it unnecessary to decide whether the punitive damages
awarded against Gates were grossly excessive. Id.
17. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257 (1989). The Browning-Ferris Court rejected the argument that
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to awards of
punitive damages in civil suits where the government has neither prosecuted
the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded. Id. at
260; see also Angarita v. St. Louis County, 981 F.2d 1537, 1546 (8th Cir.
1992) (holding that assessment of punitive damages against police officers did
not violate defendants' due process rights protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
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Court addressed the constitutionality of state court punitive
damages awards under the Due Process Clause. 18 While
upholding the punitive damages awards in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip19 and TXO Production Corp., v.
Alliance Resources Corp.,2 0 the Supreme Court stated that in

addition to requiring procedural fairness, the Due Process Clause

21
imposes some substantive limits on punitive damages awards.
In Haslip, the Court rejected both procedural and substantive due

process objections to an Alabama state court award of punitive
damages that was four times the compensatory damages
awarded. 2 2 The Court reviewed the common law method used in

Alabama for assessing punitive damages and concluded that it
was not per se unconstitutional. 2 3 The Court focused on three
aspects of the Alabama procedures: the jury charge, the trial

Amendments where conduct involved "evil motive or intent" or "reckless or
callous indifference to federally-protected rights"); Elizabeth Dale, A Civil
Rights Attorney's Guide to Punitive Damages, 3 Police Misconduct and Civil
Rights Law Report 1 (1990).
18. Additionally, the Supreme Court recently agreed to review Oregon's
unusual position which effectively disallows judicial review of punitive
damages awards. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 814 P.2d 517 (Or. Ct. App.
1991), aff'd, 851 P.2d 1084 (Or. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 751 (1994).
In Oberg, the Court of Appeals of Oregon interpreted the state Constitution to
prohibit review of punitive damage awards unless the appellate court finds that
no evidence supports the verdict. 814 P.2d at 525. The Supreme Court of
Oregon affirmed, holding that so long as the criteria used by the trial court
were constitutionally sufficient, the restrictions on appellate review were
permissible. 851 P.2d at 1096. Furthermore, appellate review was available to
test the sufficiency of jury instructions. Id. at 1097. Therefore, the punitive
damages award did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 1099. The United States Supreme Court will decide
whether defendants have a due process right to review of punitive damages
awards. See Claudia MacLachlan, High Court Takes Another Look at Punitive
Damages, NAT'L L.J., January 31, 1994 at 17.
19. 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (non section 1983 action).
20. 113 S.Ct. 2711 (1993) (non section 1983 action).
21. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-23.
22. Id.at 23-24.
23. Id.at 17.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1994], Art. 10

548

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

court's post-verdict review, and the standard of appellate
review. 24
After carefully reviewing the jury instructions, which advised
the jury of the deterrent and punishment purposes of a punitive
damages award, of the need to consider the character and the
degree of the wrong, and of the fact that the award was
discretionary, the Supreme Court in Haslip concluded that the
instructions accommodated the defendant's "interest in rational
decision making" and the state's "interest in meaningful
individualized assessment of appropriate deterrence and
retribution." 25
The Court also reviewed and approved the post-verdict review
procedures which, in Alabama, are quite refined and operate at
two levels. First, the trial court considers a number of
substantive factors and justifies its review of the award on the
record. 2 6 Second, the appellate court conducts a comparative
review and applies detailed substantive standards for evaluating
the award and determining whether the punitive damages award
is reasonable in amount and reasonably related to the goals of
deterrence and punishment. 27
While approving Alabama's common law scheme, the Supreme
Court in Haslip declined to fashion a "mathematical bright line
between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally
24. Id. at 19-21.

25. Id. at 20.
26. Id. The factors to be considered include the "'culpability of the
defendant's conduct;'" the "'desirability of discouraging others from similar
conduct;'" the "'impact upon the parties'" and "'other factors, such as the
impact on innocent third parties.'" Id. (quoting Hammond v. Gadsden, 493 So.
2d 1374, 1379 (Ala. 1986)). The Hammond court held that a trial court may
order a new trial to reconsider an excessive jury verdict only after application
of the above enumerated factors. 493 So. 2d at 1378. The Hammond court also
cautioned that:
only where the record establishes that the award is excessive or
inadequate as a matter of law, or where it is established and reflected in
the record that the verdict is based upon bias, passion, corruption, or
other improper motive may a trial court order a new trial or remittitur.
Id.
27. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21.
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unacceptable," relying instead on a "constitutional calculus"
28
based generally on reasonableness.

The Haslip approach was reaffirmed last Term in TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,29 where the
Court upheld a punitive damages award that was more than 526
times greater than the compensatory damages award. 30 While the
defendant urged that the test for assessing the constitutionality of
the award requires a comparison to other awards made in similar
circumstances, 3 1 the plurality rejected a strict comparative
approach. 32 Further, the plurality stated that in reviewing for
excessiveness, the relationship between the punitive damages and
compensatory damages is only one of the pertinent factors, and
that "[iut is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential
harm that the defendant's conduct would have caused to its
intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the

possible harm that might have resulted if similar future behavior
were not deterred." 33 Ultimately, according to the plurality, the
only

substantive

"reasonableness. "34

due

process

limitation

is

one

of

28. Id. at 18.
29. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
30. Id. at 2714. The trial court awarded $10 million dollars in punitive
damages and $19,000 in actual damages. Id.
31. Id. at 2719.
32. Id. at 2720. The Court held:
while we do not rule out the possibility that the fact that an award is
significantly larger than those in apparently similar circumstances
might, in a given case, be one of many relevant considerations, we are
not prepared to enshrine petitioner's comparative approach in a 'test' for
assessing the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.
Id.
33. Id. at 2721-22.
34. Id. at 2720-21. Yet, the plurality in TXO did not intend to "suggest
that a defendant has a substantive due process right to a correct determination
of the 'reasonableness' of a punitive damages award." Id. n.24. Justice Stevens
further stated: "Assuming that fair procedures were followed, a judgment that
is a product of that process is entitled to a strong presumption of validity." Id.
at 2720. Regarding the constitutional guarantee against irrational or arbitrary
deprivations of property, Justice Kennedy added: "When a punitive damage
award reflects bias, passion, or prejudice on the part of the jury, rather than a
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With respect to the procedural due process claim, the TXO
Court declined to reach the issue of whether it is permissible to
allow the jury to take account of defendant's wealth, because the
issue had not been preserved for appeal. 35 Turning to the postverdict review of the award, the Court ruled that the trial judge's
failure to articulate the reasons for upholding the award was not a
constitutional violation and that the system of appellate review
36
was in accordance with the principles expressed in Haslip.
Neither Haslip nor TXO are section 1983 cases. This raises the
question of whether the due process limitations articulated in
Haslip and TXO apply in federal court section 1983 actions. In
Morgan v. Woessner,37 the Ninth Circuit was confronted with
this issue in a section 1983 action for unconstitutional arrest
brought by former baseball star Joe Morgan arising out of an
encounter with the Los Angeles police. 3 8 (Morgan was decided
by the circuit court post-Haslip but pre-TXO.) 39 In its initial
opinion in the case, the circuit court held that Haslip did not alter
the Smith v. Wade principles of federal court section 1983
punitive damages. 40 However, in a subsequent opinion
superseding its original opinion, the circuit court completely
reversed course and ruled that the principles of Haslip are fully
applicable to federal court section 1983 punitive damages

rational concern for deterrence and retribution, the Constitution has been
violated." Id. at 2725. (Kennedy, J., concurring). In all, seven Justices in 7XO
recognized the existence of some substantive due process restraints on state
court punitive damage awards.
35. Id. at 2723-24.
36. Id. at 2724.

37. 975 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1992), supersededby, 997 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir.
1993).
38. Id. at 631-32.

39. Morgan v. Woessner, 975 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1992) (decided on
September 25, 1992); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)
(decided on March 4, 1991); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (decided on June 25, 1993). Morgan was later

superseded in 1993, fifteen days before TXO was decided. See 997 F.2d 1244
(9th Cir. 1993).
40. Morgan, 975 F.2d at 640.
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claims. 4 1 The circuit court reasoned that "[it would be
incongruous for the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to apply to state law punitive damages and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment not apply to federal
punitive damages." 42
The circuit court in Morgan then went on to apply the Haslip
approach by subjecting the federal court procedures to due
process scrutiny at three stages: jury instructions, post-verdict
review by the trial court, and appellate review. 43 The circuit
court found the district court's instructions adequate in that they
advised the jury of the purposes of punitive damages, of the need
to consider the reprehensibility of defendant's conduct, and that
punitive damages awards are discretionary. 44 However, the
Morgan Court ruled that the trial court's failure to record its
reasons for upholding the award warranted a remand to the
district court on the punitive damages issue. 45 Significantly, just
two weeks later, the Supreme Court held in TXO that while it is
"always helpful for trial judges to explain the basis for their
rulings... we are certainly not prepared to characterize the trial
judge's failure to articulate the basis for his denial of the motions
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remittitur as a
46
constitutional violation."
With respect to the procedures utilized on appellate review, the
Morgan court indicated that an appellate court's function is
twofold. 47 First, the appellate court must satisfy itself that the
jury charges were proper and that the trial court recorded its
reasons for upholding or altering the award. 4 8 Second, the
appellate court must conduct a "substantive review of the amount
41. 997 F.2d at 1255.
42. Id. at 1255 n.8.
43. Id. at 1256-58.

44. Id. at 1256-57. The jury charge should make clear that the purpose of
punitive damages is to deter the defendant and possibly other individuals from
similar conduct in the future, and to punish the defendant. Id. at 1256.
45. Id. at 1257.
46. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2724.

47. Morgan, 997 F.2d at 1257.
48. Id.
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of the award." 49 Because Haslip suggested that the "manifestly
and grossly excessive" standard which had been previously

utilized in the Ninth Circuit might not comport with due process,
the circuit court "refashioned" the standard into one requiring the
appellate court to determine whether the award "exceeds the

amount necessary to accomplish the goals of punishment and
deterrence." 50
The Second Circuit, in Vasbinder v. Scott,5 1 applied Haslip to
the question of whether a punitive damages award assessed in a
whistle blowing case was excessive under the Due Process
Clause. 52 The Second Circuit utilizes a "shocks the conscience"
standard when reviewing punitive damage awards for
excessiveness. 53 In applying this standard, the Second Circuit
49. Id. at 1257-58.
50. Id. at 1258. Judge Nelson, dissenting in Morgan, read Haslip as
imposing a two (rather than three) step due process approach: "(1) what
safeguards are in place at the trial court level... ?; and (2) what post-verdict
review procedures are there, at the trial court and/or appellate levels, and how
meaningful are they?" Id. at 1263 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Interestingly, in
Robertson Oil Co., Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 91-3717, 1993 WL
532709 (8th Cir. 1993) the Eighth Circuit held in a decision rendered after
both Haslip and Morgan that a "shock the conscience" test, as applied and
supplemented by Arkansas courts, did not violate due process. Id. at *3-*5.
The Robertson court reasoned that the factors considered by the district court,
while not identical to those spelled out in Haslip, coincided closely enough to
comport with due process. Id. at *5.
51. 976 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit's prior decision in
Vasbinder v. Ambach, 926 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1991), also discussed important
issues of section 1983 punitive damages. In Ambach, the court held that once a
jury decides to award punitive damages, those claims should normally not be
dismissed without allowing the jury to determine the dollar amount of punitive
damages. Id. at 1344. Proceeding in this manner enables the court of appeals,
in the case of a judgment n.o.v., to reinstate the jury's award instead of
remanding for further presentation of evidence. Id.; see also Martin A.
Schwartz, Damages for Constitutional Violations, N.Y. L.J., September 17,
1991 at 3, 6.
52. Scott, 976 F.2d at 121.
53. Awards of punitive damages should be reversed only if they are "so
high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice." Id.
(quoting Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 850 F.2d 876, 883 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988). See also O'Neill v. Krzeminski, 839
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noted Haslip's admonition that the appellate court's function is to
insure that the "'punitive damages are reasonable in their amount
and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has occurred
54
and to deter its repetition.'
Applying this standard, the circuit court in Scott determined

that the award was excessive when considered in light of the
defendants' net worth. 55 The punitive damages constituted more
than 50% of one defendant's net worth and 30% of the other
defendant's net worth, a disproportionately large percentage of
each defendant's net worth. 56 The punitive damages award
substantially exceeded the amount necessary to punish and deter,
57
and constituted an unjustifiable windfall to the plaintiff.

NET WORTH
As the decision in Scott demonstrates, the defendant official's
finances play a vital role in determining the amount of punitive
damages that should be awarded. 58 Three important procedural

issues arise in connection with the defendant's net worth: (1) who
bears the burden of introducing evidence regarding defendant's
F.2d 9, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding punitive damage award of $185,000 not
excessive in light of fact that handcuffed arrestee had been repeatedly hit on
head by officers); but see King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1993)
(reducing punitive damage awards of $175,000 against one defendant and
$100,000 against another to $100,000 and $50,000 respectively); see also
Nairn v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 837 F.2d 565, 566-67 (2d Cir. 1988)
(utilizing "shock the conscience" test to determine whether trial court's refusal
to reduce jury award constituted abuse of discretion).
54. Scott, 976 F.2d at 121 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 121 (1991)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 122.
58. Id. (citing Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 373 (2d
Cir. 1988)) (holding that the district court may consider evidence of
defendant's financial circumstances when reviewing punitive damage award on
remand); see also Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 91-3717,
1993 WL 532709, *7 (8th Cir. Dec. 28, 1993) (permitting jury to consider
defendant's financial worth for purposes of punitive damages award does not
violate due process).
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net worth?; (2) at what stage may that evidence be considered?;
and (3) what role does the Seventh Amendment right to trial by
jury play when punitive damages are determined to be excessive
in light of the defendant's financial status?
Most federal courts have concluded that the defendant bears the
burden of demonstrating his or her financial circumstances. 59 We
believe that this makes sense since the defendant has ready access
to this evidence. 60 In Keenan v. City of Philadelphia61 the Third
Circuit majority found that the defendants, by failing to present

the issue to the district court, waived their "argument that
evidence of their financial condition is a prerequisite to a punitive
damages award." 62 Judge Higginbotham, dissenting, took the

position that where municipal indemnification is involved, the
plaintiff has the burden of producing evidence of the defendant's
net worth in order to insure that the amount awarded is
appropriate. 63 In his view, when there is municipal
indemnification, treating the issue as having been waived and
allowing punitive damages to be assessed in the absence of
evidence of the defendant official's net worth "sanctions a raid on
the City's treasury-a raid by which only the plaintiffs and their

59. See, e.g., King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1993) see also infra
notes 67-75 and accompanying text; Hutchinson v. Stuckey, 952 F.2d 1418,
1422 n.4 ("the weight of authority places on the defendant the burden of
producing evidence of his own financial condition if he wishes it considered by
the jury."); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1978). The Zarcone
court found that "a defendant [carries] the burden of showing his modest
means - facts peculiarly within his power - if he wants this considered in
mitigation of damages." Id.; Littlefield v. Mack, 750 F. Supp. 1395, 1402
(N.D. M1. 1990) (finding that defendant must suffer the consequences of
choosing not to introduce evidence of his ability to pay punitive damages),
af4'd, 954 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1992).
60. See e.g., ITSI TV Prods., Inc. v. Agricultural Ass'ns, 3 F.3d 1289,
1293 (9th Cir. 1993) ("'[When the true facts relating to [a] disputed issue lie
peculiarly within the knowledge of' one party, the burden of proof may
properly be assigned to that party in the 'interest of fairness.'" (quoting United
States v. Hayes, 639 F.2d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1966))).
61. 983 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1992).
62. Id. at 471.
63. Id. at 484 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
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lawyers unnecessarily benefit and from which the taxpayers

needlessly suffer. "64
In our view Judge Higginbotham's reference to a raid on the
public treasury is unwarranted. After all, governmental
indemnification of punitive damages, like any other governmental
indemnification, comes about only as a result of a voluntary
policy choice of government. 65 It is neither compelled by federal
law nor the federal court decree.
An issue that has divided the circuits is whether the trial judge

may consider evidence of the defendant's financial circumstances
in reviewing a jury verdict of punitive damages on a post-verdict
motion to reduce the award. 6 6 In King v. Macri6 7 the Second

Circuit stated that while ordinarily the defendant's showing
regarding financial worth should be made to the jury, the trial
judge has the discretion to receive that evidence when
considering a motion to reduce the award. 68 Other courts,
however, have held that defendants are not entitled to a new trial
or to have the verdict set aside in order to introduce evidence
64. Id. at 477 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
65. See, e.g., Cornwell v. City of Riverside, 896 F.2d 398, 399-400 (9th
Cir.) (finding that it is up to the municipality to decide whether to indemnify
municipal employees from punitive damages), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1026
(1990); Gordon v. Norman, 788 F.2d 1194, 1196 n.1 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding
that Tennessee law allows indemnification of judgments against government
employees but not for punitive damages); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d
645 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986). The Duckworth court
stated that "[Tlie purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is only to protect the
state against involuntary liability. If the state chooses to pick up the tab for its
errant officers, its liability for their torts is voluntary." Id. at 650-51.
66. See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F. 3d 1371, 1384 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding
that two million dollar punitive damages award was well within defendant's
ability to pay); King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1993), see also infra
notes 67-75 and accompanying text discussing case; Keenan v. City of
Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1992) see also supra notes 61-64 and
accompanying text discussing case; Waltemeyer v. Park, No. 92-00008A,
1992 WL 245665, *2 (D. Guam App. Div. 1992) (concluding that sufficient
evidence of defendant's financial worth was produced at trial to permit the jury
to assess punitive damages).
67. 993 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1993).
68. Id. at 298.
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regarding net worth when the defendant failed to introduce that
69
evidence at trial.

There is some question whether the Seventh Amendment right
to trial by jury is implicated when evidence of a defendant's
financial condition is considered post-verdict. 70 Similarly, there
is disagreement in the circuits as to whether the Seventh
Amendment permits an appellate court, reviewing for
excessiveness, to reduce the award without offering the plaintiff

the option of a new trial. 71 In the Second Circuit's view, the
Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial requires that when
the jury award of punitive damages is set aside as excessive, the

plaintiff must be offered the option of a new trial or acceptance
of a remittitur. 72
King v. Macri also contains a discussion of other important

punitive damages issues. First, the court ruled that punitive
damages may be awarded under section 1983 even in the absence

of a compensatory award. 73 Furthermore, the court stated that
where the plaintiff presents two or more related claims, (e.g.,
69. See, e.g., Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 471-72 (3d
Cir. 1992) (finding that the argument that evidence of financial worth was
prerequisite to punitive damage award was waived by failure to present
evidence with "sufficient specificity"); Albert v. DePinto, 638 F. Supp. 1307,
1310 n.3 (D. Conn. 1986) (holding that it was impermissible to allow
defendants to introduce evidence of financial worth not introduced at trial).
70. See Keenan, 983 F.2d at 483 n.11 (Higginbotham, J. dissenting),
(citing Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 107-10 (4th Cir. 1991)
(stating that there might be a Seventh Amendment controversy if the financial
condition of the defendant was introduced as new evidence during a post-trial
review).
71. See Vasbinder v. Scott, 976 F.2d at 122-23 (holding that a court must
offer plaintiff the option of having a new trial before reducing an award of
punitive damages); Defender Indus. Inc., v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
938 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the right to a jury
determination of the amount of punitive damages is guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment), aff'd, 989 F.2d 492 (1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3038.
72. See Scott, 976 F.2d at 122.
73. King, 993 F.2d at 298. The court ruled that under these specific
circumstances it was not an error by the jury to only award punitive damages,
because the jury was explicitly told that it could award punitive damages
without finding any compensatory damages. Id.
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false arrest and excessive force), the jury should normally be
instructed to make one aggregate award of punitive damages with
respect to each defendant, "except in cases involving significantly
distinct forms of misconduct." 74 Allowing separate awards for
related claims growing out of the same conduct creates a real
danger of a grossly excessive award. 75
COMMENTING ON THE RODNEY KING CASE
Is it prejudicial error, in excessive force cases, to impliedly or
explicitly refer to the Rodney King case when urging a jury to
assess punitive damages? This issue, too, was presented in King
v. Macri.76 The trial in King on excessive force, false arrest, and

malicious prosecution claims occurred soon after the state court
trial of the police officers accused of beating Rodney King.
Plaintiff's counsel in summation in King v. Macri urged the jury
to assess punitive damages so that defendants and others "'will
no longer think they're above the law, so that they won't be
arrogant and think they can do whatever they want, so that they
won't think that because they have a badge and they have a
uniform they can violate people's rights.'" 77 Punitive damages,
he argued, would also send "'that same message to others in a
position to abuse their authority.'" 78
The district court found nothing improper in these remarks:
"[To the extent that the Los Angeles riots may have altered
community perceptions of the proper response to allegations of
police misconduct, the shift in societal attitudes is just one facet
74. Id. at 299.
75. See id.; see also Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371 (3d Cir. 1993). In a non
section 1983 product liability action, the Third Circuit reduced a punitive
damages award against a manufacturer of asbestos products because "the
district court gave insufficient consideration to the effect of successive punitive
damages awards in asbestos litigation." Id. at 1391. The circuit court
suggested that district courts "should... consider whether the financial status
of the defendant is such that future claimants will be unable to collect even
compensatory damages because of the limited pool of resources available." Id.
76. King, 993 F.2d at 298.
77. Id. at 298.
78. Id.
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represents. " 7

9

of the community'

..

that the jury

The Second Circuit, too, found nothing unlawful in the

summation. "Similar remarks are made in summations in most
police misconduct trials, and are entirely appropriate. The
temporal proximity of this trial to the state court Rodney King
verdict is not a basis for limiting the normal scope of

advocacy." 80

The Eleventh Circuit, in the context of an explicit reference to
the Rodney King case, took a more cautious approach in
Vineyard v. County of Murray.8 1 In that case, the plaintiff's
attorney began his summation by stating:
If there is anything good or positive that came out of the horrible
Rodney King beating that most of you witnessed on television,
[it] is that the issue of police brutality was brought to the
forefront of the news across the country and it gave a lot of
people the opportunity to realize that police brutality does
82
occur.

Even after the district court's cautionary instruction that the
King incident had nothing to do with the case at hand, plaintiff's
attorney again referred to Rodney King, stating that "there is no
video tape in this case." 8 3 The circuit court majority found that
the district court's curative instruction avoided any unfair
prejudice to the defendants. 84 However, Judge Godbold,
79. 800 F. Supp. 1157, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd in part, vacated and
remanded in part, 993 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1993).
80. King, 993 F.2d at 298.
81. 990 F.2d 1207 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 636 (1993).
82. Id. at 1213.
83. Id.
84. Id. After the initial statements of the plaintiff's attorney's closing
argument, the court gave these instructions to the jury: "What happened in
California, and even though he didn't mention California, ihat's where it
happened, really doesn't have anything to do with this case. This case is to be
tried upon the evidence in this case." Id. At the end of plaintiff's closing
argument, the judge denied defendant's motion for a mistrial and followed with
these instructions for the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, let me interrupt just a moment to point out to you
that the purpose of a verdict is not really to send messages out generally
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"egregiously

improper" and warranting reversal since, "[f]ew matters in
modem times have rubbed raw the emotions of individual
citizens.., as have the Rodney King events." 85 Thus, what was
considered ordinary advocacy to the Second Circuit in King was
viewed with caution in Vineyard and as egregiously wrong by
Judge Godbold. 86
CONCLUSION

The continued vitality of punitive damages awards is
particularly significant in section 1983 litigation. As the Supreme
Court recognized in Carlson v. Green,87 "punitive damages may
be the only significant remedy available in some section 1983
actions where constitutional rights are maliciously violated but
the victim cannot prove compensable injury." 88 The Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Haslip and 7XO upholding punitive
damages awards against due process attacks insure that punitive
to people. The purpose of a jury verdict, if it is awarding damages, is to
compensate a plaintiff if he's entitled to an award of damages, and in
some instances it may be appropriate to award punitive damages, if it is
appropriate to award punitive damages, then that is done to punish a
defendant or defendants, and that's the real purpose of damages, if it's
appropriate to award them.
Id. at 1214.
85. Id. (Godbold, J., dissenting).
86. Id. The Seventh Circuit also dealt with the Rodney King issue in the
context of Fourth Amendment challenge to a strip search of an arrestee
brought pursuant to section 1983; Doe v. Burnham, 6 F.3d 476 (7th Cir.
1993). Plaintiff's counsel stated during summation: "We do not like to believe
that witnesses get on the stand and lie, let alone police officers who are sworn
to uphold and protect the law and serve and protect us, but we know it
happens. We've seen it in the news, we've seen it on videotape." Id. at 478.
The Seventh Circuit thought it "logical to assume that he was making a not-soveiled reference to the videotaped beating of Rodney King." Id. at 481.
However, the officers in this case had nothing to do with Rodney King and
"should be judged according to the facts of [the instant] case. At least a
limiting instruction would have been appropriate here. But we need not assess
the effect of this error since we have reversed on other grounds." Id. at 481.
87. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
88. Id. at 22 n.9.
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damages can continue to be assessed in section 1983 cases so
long as the award is rationally related to the twin goals of
punishment and deterrence, and is accompanied by fair
procedures.
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